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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Contrary to Appellant's assertion, this case does not arise out of Respondent 
Plaintiffs' ("Plaintiffs") attempts to punish a man for doing a charitable act for his neighbor. 
Rather, this case arises from a collision between a vehicle driven by the decedent, Kenneth 
Tiegs, and a baler driven by Defendant Dustin Kukla ("Kukla") and owned by 
DefenddAppellant Darrell Robertson ("Robertson"). The collision occurred on July 30, 
2003, and resulted in the death of Kenneth Tiegs. The collision occurred while Mr. Kukla 
was driving the baler from one field to another on a public highway at approximately 
10:30pm without operating lights, a condition Mr. Robertson knew the baler to be in at the 
time he loaned the baler to Mr. Kukla. Mr. Tiegs was driving down the highway at the same 
time and collided into the back of the baler. Mr. Tiegs died on the scene as a result of the 
accident. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiffs do not generally dispute the course of proceedings as is set forth 
within Robertson's Appellant's Brief. 
C Statement of Facts. 
Plaintiffs also do not generally dispute the facts as set forth within the 
Appellant's Brief However, Plaintiffs believe some significant material facts are missing 
from this statement. Specifically, that at the time he loaned the baler to Kukla, Robertson 
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knew that the lights on the baler did not work. See R. Vol. 111, p. 384 (p.50, LL 8-23). 
Robertson M e r  testified within his pre-trial deposition that while he knew that the Idaho 
law required lighting in both the front and back ofthe tractor and baler if it was operated on a 
public road at night, he never informed Dustin KuMa that the lights on the baler did not 
work. See R. Vol. 111, p. 385, (p. 52, line 25 - p. 53, line 8). Robertson fkther testified at his 
pre-trial deposition that he knew that tractors and balers were transported at night with proper 
lighting. See R Vol. III, p. 385 (p. 53, LL 9-12). Robertson f d e r  testified that he knew 
that baling activities were typically performed in the evening hours after sunset. See R. Vol. 
111, p. 383 (p. 38, line 25 - p. 39, line 6). 
Despite this knowledge, Robertson never took any steps to discuss the lighting 
issues with Kukla at the time Kukla borrowed the tractor and baler despite the fact that he 
had no knowledge of, and made no inquiry about, Kukla's farming practices. See R. Vol. 111, 
p. 385, (p. 53, lime 17 - p. 54, line 1). Dustin Kukla testified at his pre-trial deposition that 
Robertson knew that the Scholl property (where Kukla was baling using Robertson's tractor 
and baler) included several different parcels and that Robertson was aware that Dustin would 
have to transport the tractor and baler &om one parcel to another in the course of his baling 
activities. See R. Vol. 111, p. 391, (p. 117, LL 16-23). Kukla also testified that the road used 
to transport the tractor and baler from one field to another was Highway 45. See R Vol. 111, 
p. 391 (p. 117, line 24 - p. 118, line 2). Kukla further testified at his pre-trial deposition that 
he was not aware that the lights were not working on the tractor and baler. See R. Vol. In, p. 
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392 (p. 124, line 18 - p. 125 line 21). Kukla also testified at his pre-trial deposition that 
Robertson never told him that the lights did not work on the baler, nor did he tell Dustin that 
he could not transport the tractor and baler at night. See R. Vol. 111, p. 389 (p. 101, line 4 - p. 
102, line 15). 
Lastly, KuMa testified in his deposition that he was traveling approximately 20 miles 
per hour on Highway 45 at the time of the accident. R. Vol. 11, p. 31 1 (p. 135, LL 1-6). The 
speed limit on Nighway 45 at the time was 50 miles per hour. See R. Vol. 11, p. 302, (p.99, 
LL 12-15). 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Robertson Cannot Appeal the Denial of his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The first issue listed for appeal by Robertson within the Appellant's Brief is 
"Whether Appellate [sic] Robertson's Motion for Summary Judgment Should Have Been 
Granted by the District Court?" Robertson then goes on to discuss the standard of review for 
the granting of a summary judgment by the district court, but does not discuss the appellate 
standard of review for a denial of summary judgment. Because the Idaho Supreme Court 
does not review denials of motions for summary judgment, Robertson's appeal of that denial 
must be denied in its entirety. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has long rehsed to review an order denying 
summary judgment either on direct appeal of the denial or upon appeal from a finai 
judgment. See, e.g., Hunter v. Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 47, 57 P.3d 755, 757 (2002) 
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(citing Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration Inc., 134 Idaho 738,743,9 P.3d 12-4, 1209 (2000); 
see also, Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371,376,973 P.2d 142, 147 (1999); Watson 
v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hospitals, 11 1 Idaho 44, 46, 720 P.2d 632, 634 (1986); Evans v. 
Jenson, 103 Idaho 937, 941, 655 P.2d 454, 458 (Ct. App. 1982). The Court has held that 
"[ilt is well-settled in Idaho that '[aln order denying a motion for summary judgment is an 
interlocutory order from which no direct appeal may be taken.' This rule is not altered by the 
entry of an appealable final judgment." See Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539,542, 164 P.3d 
In Garcia, the appellant requested that the Court make an exception to this rule 
against review of denials of summary judgment for questions of law. I-Iowever, the Court 
expressly rejected this request, stating "[wle decline to adopt such an exception because it 
would violate the policy behiid treating orders denying summary judgment as interlocutory." 
See id. The Court then stated the rationale for the rule as follows: 
[B]y entering an order denying summary judgment, the trial 
court merely indicates that the matter should proceed to trial on 
its merits. The final judgment in a case can be tested upon the 
record made at trial, not the record made at the time summary 
judgment was denied. Any l e ~ a l  rul izs made bv the trial court 
affecting that final iudment can be reviewed at that time in 
light of the full record. . . ." 
See id. (quoting Miller v. Estate of Prater, 141, Idaho 208, 21 1, 108 P.3d 355, 358 (2000)) 
(emphasis omitted and added). Based on this rationale, the Court denied Garcia's appeal of 
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the denial of the motion for summary judgment and did so even though the Court later 
granted a new trial to Garcia based upon an erroneous jury instruction. See id. 
In this case, Robertson is asking the Court to do exactly what the cases cited 
above forbid - to go back and review the district court's decision on summary judgment and 
"view the relative strengths and weaknesses of the litigants at that earlier stage." See id. 
Issues A.3 and A.4 within Appellant's Brief are clearly asking the Court to determine 
whether, at the time the summary judgment motion was filed by Robertson, Plaintiffs had 
submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 19-20 and pp. 23-26. The cases cited above repeatedly state that the Court cannot 
and will not undertake such a review. See, e.g., Garcia, 144 Idaho at 542, 164 P.3d at 822. 
As the Court stated in Garcia, "[a] fmal judgment has been entered in this case and that 
judgment can and should be tested upon the record made at trial, not the record existing at 
the moment in time summary judgment was denied." See id. The Court denied any review 
of the denial of summary judgment even though Garcia asserted that the denial was based on 
a legal misconception. See id. Thus, it is clear that the Court will not review denials of 
summary judgment even when such denials are based on legal rulings. See id. 
It is important to note that Robertson has not appealed any denial of a motion 
for directed verdict, nor has Robertson appealed the giving of any particular jury instruction 
or instructions that he believes were a misstatement of the law applicable to this case. 
Additionally, all of the citations to evidence in the record in support of his appeal of these 
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summary judgment issues are citations to deposition testimony, trial testimony. As such, 
to the extent Robertson has raised legal issues within his appeal of the summary judgment 
denial, his failure to designate portions of the trial transcript containing the appropriate trial 
testimony and failure to cite to evidence submitted at the trial in this matter, makes it 
impossible for this Court to review the legal rulings "in light of the full record." See id. As 
such, Robertson's appeal of the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment 
must be denied as an appeal of an unreviewable order. 
B. The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Robertson's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
As is set forth above, Plaintiffs strongly assert that the Order denying 
Robertson's Motion for Summary Judgment is not reviewable and should not be considered 
by this Court. However, in the event the Court decides to review that Order, Plaintiffs 
respectfully request that the Order denying the Motion for Summary Judgment be affirmed 
for the reasons set forth below. 
1. - The District Court urouerlv apulied the Imputed Liability Statute to 
Robertson. 
Robertson argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion for 
summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for imputed liability because the tractor and baler are 
"implements of husbandry" under the provisions of the Idaho Motor Vehicle Act and the 
imputed liability statute only applies to motor vehicles. Idaho Code 3 49-2417 provides that 
"every owner of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of or injury to a 
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person or property resulting from negligence in the operation of his motor vehicle . . . by any 
person using or operating the vehicle with the permission, express or implied of the owner, 
and the negligence of the person shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil 
damages." See LC. § 49-2417. Idaho Code 5 49-I23(2)(g) defines "motor vehicle" as 
"every vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power 
obtained from overhead trolley wires but not operated upon rails except vehicles moved 
solely by human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and motorized 
wheelchairs. See I.C. 5 49- 123(2)(g). 
Under the plain definition of motor vehicle set forth in Idaho Code 8 49- 
123(2)(g), the tractor driven by Dustin Kukla and owned by Darrell Robertson is clearly a 
motor vehicle because it is a "self-propelled" vehicle. The definition of motor vehicle does 
not specifically exclude "implements of husbandry" &om its definition as it does other items. 
Idaho Code 5 49-1 lO(2) does define "implements of husbandry" and does state that a tractor 
which is attached to or drawing an implement of husbandry is to be construed as an 
implement of husbandry. See I.C. 5 49-1 10(2). However, the definition of "motor vehicle" 
does not exclude an instrument of husbandry. Rather, the definition of "instruments of 
husbandry" excludes some motor vehicles. See I.C. 5 49-1 lO(2). Thus, under the definitions 
provided by the statute, a motor vehicle may not qualify as an "implement of husbandry" 
unless certain conditions are met, but an implement of husbandry can be a "motor vehicle" if 
it meets the definition set forth in Idaho Code 3 49-123(g). Such a conclusion is supported 
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by other provisions of the act such as Idaho Code § 49-902 which provides that it is unlawful 
for vehicles to be operated in an unsafe condition and without proper equipment, but 
specifically excludes farm tractors and implements of husbandry to the extent they are 
specifically referenced in certain provisions. See LC. $5 49-902 and 49-916. 
Robertson argues, as he did below, that because "implements of husbandry" 
are separately defined within the Idaho Motor Vehicles Act, and that the definition states that 
implements of husbandry do not include "motor vehicles or trailers, unless their design limits 
their use to agricultural, horticultural, dairy or livestock growing and feeding operations" 
then an implement of husbandry cannot be a motor vehicle. Ilowever, the plain language of 
Idaho Code $ 49-1 10(2) does not support the conclusion that implements of husbandry are 
never motor vehicles. In fact, it clearly includes motor vehicles that are by design limited in 
their use to agricultural, horticultural, dairy or livestock growing and feeding operations. 
Nonetheless, even if the defmition of "implement of husbandry" completely 
excludes motor vehicles, the district court was nonetheless correct in its decision. As is set 
forth within the Memorandum Decision on Defendant Robertson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. Vol. 111, pp. 444-451), the District Court thoroughly analyzed the relevant 
statutory provisions and concluded that the legislature did not specify that "implements of 
husbandry" and "motor vehicles" were mutually exclusive for the purposes of the imputed 
liability statute. See R. Vol. 111, at 446. The district wurt noted that the legislature had 
expressly excluded "implements of husbandry" from numerous other regulatory statutes 
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within the Idaho Motor Vehicles Act, but had not made an explicit exclusion from the statute 
on imputed liability. See R. Vol. 111, p. 448-45 1. 
Robertson argues that the district court erred and applied its own legislative 
intent by holding that if the Legislature wanted to exclude implements of husbandry from 
Idaho's imputed negligence statute, it would have done so. Robertson asserts that because it 
could be as easily said that if the Legislature intended to include implements of husbandry as 
motor vehicles it could have done so, the district court's reasoning is in error. However, 
Robertson's argument ignores the manner in which the district court came to this conclusion 
- namely by examining numerous statutory provisions within the Idaho Motor Vehicle Act 
where the Legislature did expressly exclude "implements of husbandry" &om various 
regulations. See R. Vol. 111, pp. 448-450. Thus, the district court's decision was not based 
on some whim or its own preference. It was based on an exhaustive comparison of various 
statutory provisions within the Idaho Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, it was entirely consistent 
with the principles of statutory construction set forth by this Court that require courts to 
construe statutory provisions in para rnateria. 
Robertson further argues that because the district court admitted that many, if 
not most implements of husbandry would be excluded from the imputed liability statute, it 
improperly concluded that some implements of husbandry could be motor vehicles and 
subject to the imputed liability statute. This argument, however, ignores the fact that the 
basis for the district court's conclusion that many, if not most, implements of husbandry 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 9 
would be excluded from the imputed liability statute was that many, if not most, implements 
of husbandry are not self-propelled and, therefore, do not fall within the definition of a motor 
vehicle. The fact that many items falling into one category may be excluded from another 
category does not mean that items falling into the first category are, therefore, necessarily 
excluded from the second category. Simply put, a hay baler is not a motor vehicle because it 
is not self-propelled and, therefore, a hay baler is expressly excluded from the imputed 
liability statute. A tractor pullmg a hay baler is self-propelled and, therefore, is a motor 
vehicle and properly within the imputed liability statute. 
Finally, Robertson attempts to show the district court's error by using a 
hypothetical wherein a collision involving a stationary farm implement on the side of the 
road would not involve imputed liability, but a collision with the moving tractor that had just 
dropped the farm implement would involve imputed liability. Contrary to Robertson's 
assertion, there is nothing inconsistent or illogical about such a result. The Legislature 
determined that imputed liability applied to motor vehicles which are, by definition, self- 
propelled. This is no different than a hypothetical which involve a pick-up truck and a 
camping trailer. When the pick-up is towing the camping trailer, the whole thing is a motor 
vehicle. When the camping trailer is sitting by itself, it is not a motor vehicle. This is not 
illogical or inconsistent. It is simply a function of the definitions provided by the 
Legislature. Robertson then concludes that the Legislature did not intend for a hay baler to 
be treated differently when attached to a tractor than when it is standing alone. This, 
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however, ignores that a hay baler is vastly more dangerous when attached to a tractor than 
when standing alone. Therefore, there is a very good reason why the Legislature would have 
intended to impute liability to sonleone who loans a tractor and hay baler to another person 
who is then negligent in the operation of that tractor and hay baler. 
In conclusion, because an implement of husbandry falls within the plain 
definition of a motor vehicle within the Idaho Motor Vehicles Act, Idaho Code 3 49- 
123(2)(g) and Idaho Code 9 49-2417 impute liability to the owners of motor vehicles for 
injuries caused by the negligent acts of a person using the vehicle with the permission of the 
owner, Robertson's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for imputed liability 
was properly denied. The district court did a thorough and complete analysis of the issue and 
applied the proper rules of statutory construction. As such Plaintiffs respectfully request that 
the Court affirm the district court's denial of Robertson's motion for summary judgment. 
2. - Robertson has notproperlv presented the issue ofwhether he "'caused" 
or "knowin~lv permitted" Kukla to operate the tractor and baler on the 
road at nipht for appeal. 
Robertson's second issue with regards to the district court's denial of his 
motion for summary judgment is that there was insufficient evidence in the record to show a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Robertson caused or knowingly permitted 
Kukla to operate the tractor and baler on a public roadway at night. Robertson first spends 
several pages arguing that the district court erred in applying the Idaho Court of Appeal's 
decision in State v. Evans to the facts of this case. Plaintiffs respectfully assert that the 
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district court properly determined that the holding in State v. Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 6 P.3d 
416 (Ct. App. 2000), did apply to implements of husbandry and that, therefore, it was a 
violation of Idaho Code 3 49-902 to operate the tractor and baler without the lighting 
required by Idaho Code 49-916 on the public roadways at any time. See R. Vol. 111, pp. 
440-442. The district court looked at the rationale provide by the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
Evans and properly determined that the same rationale was applicable to the facts of this 
case. Specifically, the district court held that it was absurd to believe that the Legislature did 
not intend that the reference to Idaho Code 5 49-903 within Idaho Code 5 49-916 referred 
only to the times when the lighting equipment required must be turned on. To hold 
otherwise would render portions of Idaho Code 5 49-903 meaningless. 
Idaho Code 9 49-903 provides that every vehicle on the highway &om sunset 
to sunrise "and at any other time when there is not sufficient light to render clearly 
discemable persons and vehicles on the highwav at a distance of five hundred (500) feet 
&ad" shall have light lamps and illuminating devices "as here resvectivelv reauired for 
different classes of vehicles" subject to certain exceptions for parked vehicles. See Idaho 
Code 5 49-903 (emphasis added). Therefore, Idaho Code 5 49-903 clearly provides that 
there are a myriad of circumstances wherein visibility might be such that lights and 
illuminating devices would be required, even if it was before sunset or after sunrise. The 
only way in which this provision has any meaning is if, as stated in State v. Evans, the 
requirement of operational lamps and illuminated devices as specified for the different 
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classes of vehicles (such as those for farm equipment found in Idaho Code 5 49-916) exists at 
all times. As the Court of Appeals noted in Evans: 
For numerous reasons, operable headlights may be unexpectedly 
required long before sunset; sudden changes of weather; 
agricultural dust; smoke from burning fields or forest fires to 
name a few. We therefore conclude that Evans' reading of I.C. 
1) 49-903 as permitting the operation of vehicles with inoperable 
headlights before sunset is inconsistent with Idaho's policy of 
providing a safe highway system 
Evans, 135 Idaho at 564, 6 P.3d at 420. There is simply no reason that the same rationale 
should not apply to the requirement of lamps and illuminating devices for farm equipment 
found in Idaho Code 5 49-916. Thus, construing Idaho Code $5 49-902,49-903, and 49-916 
in para materia as required the rules of statutory construction, the only reasonable 
conclusion is the one reached by the district court - that it is a violation of the statutory 
provisions for an owner of a vehicle to cause or knowingly permit another person to operate 
that vehicle on the public roadway without operational lighting equipment as required for 
that specific vehicle. In this case, that means a tractor and baler with the operational lighting 
equipment required by Idaho Code § 49-916 cannot be moved on the public highway. 
However, even if the district court improperly applied the decision in State v. 
Evans, it is entirely irrelevant to Robertson's appeal. On page 19 of Robertson's Appellant's 
Brief, he states "Based on the plain language of the statutes that apply to Appellant's 
implement of husbandry, in order for Respondent to prove negligence per se under LC. 5 49- 
916, Respondent must provide evidence that Appellant caused or knowingly permitted Mr. 
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Kukla to operate the tractor and hay baler on a roadway at night." See Appellant's Brief, p. 
19. The district court's Memorandum Decision on Robertson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment stated, "Since Defendant Robertson put into motion (by loaning machinery to 
Kukla) a chain of events that led to the death of Kenneth Tiegs, it remains for the jury to 
decide whether there exists a nexus between Robertson's loaning his machinery to Kukla and 
Robertson "causing or knowingly permitting" Kukla to operate the equipment on Highway 
45 at the time and place that resulted in Kenneth Tieg's demise." See R. Vol. 111, p. 444. It 
is undisputed that the time and place of the collision was on a public roadway at night. 
Therefore, the Court's order clearly reflected that Plaintiffs would have to prove that 
Robertson "caused or knowingly permittes' Kukla to operate the tractor and baler on the 
public roadway at night in order to recover on the claim for negligence per se. The Court 
then found that there were genuine issues of fact remaining for trial on that issue. 
More importantly, Robertson's basis for requesting that the district court's 
denial of summary judgment be reversed is based entirely on his assertion that there was a 
lack of evidence in the record at the time of the motion for summary judgment. As was set 
forth in detail above, this is exactly the kind of denial of summary judgment that the Idaho 
Supreme Court has consistently refused to review. There was a trial in this matter held in 
September of 2008. Testimony and evidence were placed before the jury. Arguments were 
heard on proposed jury instructions. Robertson has not appealed the decision to give or deny 
any instruction he requested. He has not appealed the exclusion of any evidence on this issue 
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that he requested. He has not appealed any decision by the district court to deny a motion for 
directed verdict on this issue at the close of Plaintiffs presentation of their case. And, lastly, 
he has not cited to any testimony or evidence presented at trial which would support his 
claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the negligence per se claim. Rather, 
Robertson is asking this Court to second guess the district court's denial of the motion for 
summary judgment based on insufficient evidence at the time of the motion for summary 
judgment after a full trial of this case. Such a review is not allowed under Idaho law and the 
Court should deny Appellant's appeal on that issue. 
3. - Robertson has not urouerly uresented the issue o f  whether Plaintifs 
failed to provide suflcient evidence to establish the elements of 
nedigent entrustment for auueal. 
Finally, Robertson argues that the district court's order denying his motion for 
summary judgment should be reversed because Plaintiffs failed to submit sufficient evidence 
to establish the elements of negligent entrustment. Importantly, Robertson does not identify 
any error made by the district court in setting forth the elements of a negligent 
entrustment claim within the Court's Memorandum Decision on Defendant Robertson's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Rather, Robertson simply argues that the evidence as 
presented at the time of the motion for summary judgment was insufficient to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact and, therefore, the motion for summary judgment should have 
been granted. 
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Again, this is exactly what long-established Idaho Supreme Court case law 
prohibits. It is nothing more than an attempt to second-guess the district court's decision at 
the time of the summw judgment filings. As with the earlier argument, Robertson does not 
appeal the giving or failure to give any particular instruction on the elements of negligent 
entrustment. Nor does Robertson appeal any denial of a motion for directed verdict. In fact, 
Robertson has not properly appealed any question with regards to the cause of action 
for negligent entrustment that might arise again in any subsequent trial. As such, 
Robertson's appeal of this issue must be denied as it is an appeal of an unreviewable order. 
Additionally, Robertson's appeal of this issue should be denied because there 
is evidence, as the district court found, to support a claim for negligent entrustment. The 
district court expressly looked to the record to see what evidence supported "the notion of 
incompetence, unfitness, inexperience[], or perhaps most relevant, recklessness with regard 
to Darrell Robertson loaning Dustin Kukla a tractor and hay baler." See R. Vol. HI, p. 434. 
The district court then noted that evidence in the record demonstrated that Robertson knew 
that baling was typically performed at night. See R. Vol. 111, p. 434 (citing to Robertson's 
deposition testimony). The district court then held that it was a jury question as to whether it 
was foreseeable that Kukla would move the baler at night based on Robertson's knowledge 
that baling was done at night. See id. The district court further noted that it was for the jury 
to decide whether Robertson's act of loaning the tractor and baler to Kukla, under the 
peculiar circumstances of this case, could reasonably be foreseen as the starting point of a 
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first order effect that naturally and probably led to the death of Kenneth Tiegs. See R. Vol. 
111, p. 435. 
In the event the Court decides to fully address Robertson's negligent 
entrustment issue, Plaintiffs respectfully assert that Robertson has incorrectly identified the 
elements of negligent entrustment. Specifically, Robertson asserts that he was entitled to 
summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for negligent entrustment because Plaintiffs cannot 
establish that Robertson knew or should have known that Kukla was an incapacitated or 
incompetent person who would use the tractor and baler in a manner that would create an 
unreasonable risk of harm to others. However, Plaintiffs believe that Robertson misstates the 
standard for a negligent entrustment claim in Idaho, as well as the facts supporting Plaintiffs' 
claim. 
In Ransom v. City of Garden City, 113 Idaho 202, 743 P.2d 70 (1987), the 
Supreme Court of Idaho expressly adopted the definition of negligent entrustment &om the 
Restatement (Second of Torts) 9 308 (1965) which states: 
It is negligent to permit a third person to use a thing or engage 
in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor 
knows or should know that such person intends or is likely to 
use the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in such a 
manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. 
See id. (emphasis added). 
This is the definition of the tort of negligent entrustment as adopted by the 
Idaho Supreme Court. Nothing in Ransom purports to limit the tort to cases of intoxicated or 
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incapacitated drivers. In fact, in discussing the tort of negligent entrustment, the Court 
expressly recognized that "[tlhe cases illustrate that the negligent entrustment rule is nothing 
more than a particularized application of general tort principles." See Ransom, 113 Idaho at 
207, 743 P.2d at 75. The Court then quoted from Prosser and Keaton stating: 
"The duty to take precautions against the negligence of others 
thus involves merely the usual process of multiplying the 
probabiliw that such negligence will occur bv the mamitude of 
the harm likelv to result if it does. and weighing the result 
against the burden upon the defendant of exercising such care. 
The duty arises, in other words, only where a reasonable person 
would recognize the existence of an unreasonable risk of harm 
to others through the intervention of such negligence. It 
becomes most obvious when the actor has reason to know that 
he is dealing with persons whose characteristics make it 
especially likely that they will do unreasonable things. The 
actor may be required to guard an insane patient to prevent him 
from jumping from the hospital window, or to refrain from 
putting an intoxicated person off of a train into a railroad yard, 
or letting him have an automobile, or more liquor." 
See Ransom, 113 Idaho at 206-207, 743 P.2d at 75-76 (quoting Prosser and Keeton, The Law 
of Torts 3 33, at 199 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis added). The Court then concluded that 
"[wlhere a person has a right to control a vehicle, he must exercise ordinary care and not 
permit another to use it in circumstances where he knows or should foreseeably know that 
such use may create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. See Ransom, 113 Idaho at 208, 
As is set forth clearly above, the Court did not adopt the tort of negligent 
entrustment only in the specific cases of an incompetent or incapacitated person. Rather, the 
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Court adopted the tort and specified the duty arising from the right to control a vehicle -that 
the owner exercise reasonable care and not permit another to use it in circumstances where 
he knows, or should foreseeably know that such use may create an unreasonable risk of harm 
to others. 
This definition of negligent entrustment was expressly cited and followed in 
Lopez v. Langer, 114 Idaho 873,761 P.2d 1225 (1988). In Lopez, the Court stated the tort of 
negligent entrustment as "[aln owner or other person in control of a vehicle and responsible 
for its use may be held liable for damages resulting from use of the vehicle by another under 
the theory of negligent entrustment, where such person knew or should have known that such 
use may create an unreasonable risk of harm to others." See id. at 875,761 P.2d at 1227. 
Robertson insists that proving that he knew that Dustin Kukla was an 
incompetent or incapacitated person is necessary to proving a claim of negligent entrustment. 
However, Robertson can cite to no Idaho case law in which the Court has expressly 
identified that aspect as an actual element of a negligent entrustment case. In fact, the district 
court could cite to no such case either. Rather, both Robertson and the district court relied 
upon the title of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 9 308 from which this Court adopted the 
definition of negligent entrustment. That title states "Permitting Improper Persons to Use 
Things or Engage in Activities." See Restatement (Second) of Torts, $308. 
Despite the presence of the "improper person" phrase in the title, the text of 
the section as adopted by this Courl in Ransom, makes no such reference to an improper 
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person. Further, the comment to the Restatement also cited by the Court in Ransom, does not 
require that the person entrusted be incompetent or unfit. Rather, the comment simply 
acknowledges that the tort of negligent entrustment occurs most frequently in such situations. 
See Ransom, 113 Idaho at 206-207,734 P.3d at 74-75 (noting that the comments explain that 
the rule "is most frequently applied . . ."). The comments also state that the rule may apply 
"if the third person's known character or the veculiar circumstances of the case are such as to 
give the actor good reason to believe that the third person may misuse it." See id. quoting 
Restatement (Second) Torts, 3 308, comment b. As the district court determined, "there 
exists enough in the deposition testimony material submitted to this court to make the 
underlined portions a jury question." See R. Vol. 111, p. 433. 
Although each case in which the Court has discussed this element of the tort of 
negligent entrustment actually involved a person who was intoxicated or otherwise 
incompetent, the Idaho Court has never held that the tort of negligent entrustment arises & 
in that situation. Rather, as is set forth above, the Court has recognized the general duty to 
not permit another person to use a vehicle where such person knew or should have known 
that such use may create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. See Ransom, 113 Idaho at 
208, 743 P.2d at 76; Lopez, 114 Idaho at 875, 761 P.2d at 1227. Certainly, there are 
situations where the person knows that, under the particular circumstances at issue, an 
unreasonable risk of harm may exist even if the person being entrusted with the vehicle is not 
otherwise incapacitated or incompetent. 
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In fact, this is just such a case. In opposition to Robertson's motion for 
summary judgment, Plaintiffs presented evidence that at the time he loaned the baler to 
Kukla, Robertson knew that the lights on the baler did not work. See R. Vol. 111, p. 384 
(p.50, LL 8-23). Robertson further testified within his pre-trial deposition that while he 
knew that the Idaho law required lighting in both the .ti.ont and back of the tractor and baler if 
it was operated on a public road at night, he never informed Dustin Kukla that the lights on 
the baler did not work. See R. Vol. In, p. 385, (p. 52, liie 25 - p. 53, line 8). Robertson 
further testified at his pre-trial deposition that he knew that tractors and balers were 
transported at night with proper lighting. See R. Vol. 111, p. 385 (p. 53, LL 9-12). Robertson 
further testified that he knew that baling activities were typically performed in the evening 
hours after sunset. See R. Vol. 111, p. 383 (p. 38, liie 25 - p. 39, lime 6). 
Despite this knowledge, Robertson never took any steps to discuss the lighting 
issues with Kukla at the time Kukla borrowed the tractor and baler despite the fact that he 
had no knowledge of, and made no inquiry about, Kukla's farming practices. See R. Vol. 111, 
p. 385, @. 53, line 17 - p. 54, line 1). Robertson testified that he did not know Kukla's 
farming practices at the time he loaned the tractor and baler to Kukla and made no inquiries 
regarding his habits and practices in transporting farm equipment prior to loaning the tractor 
and baler to Kukla. See R. Vol. 111, p. 385 (p. 53, line 20 - p. 54, line I). Dustin Kukla 
testified at his pre-trial deposition that Robertson knew that the Scholl property (where Kukla 
was bding using Robertson's tractor and baler) included several different parcels and that 
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Robertson was aware that Dustin would have to transport the tractor and baler from one 
parcel to another in the course of his baling activities. See R. Vol. III, p. 391, (p. 117, LL 16- 
23). Kukla also testified that the road used to transport the tractor and baler from one field to 
another was Highway 45. See R. Vol. 111, p. 391 (p. 117, line 24 - p. 118, line 2). Kukla 
further testified at his pre-trial deposition that he was not aware that the lights were not 
working on the tractor and baler. See R. Vol. 111, p. 392 (p. 124, line 18 - p. 125 line 21). 
Kukla also testified at his pre-trial deposition that Robertson never told h i  that the lights 
did not work on the baler, nor did he tell Dustin that he could not transport the tractor and 
baler at night. See R. Vol. 111, p. 389 (p. 101, line 4 - p. 102, line 15). 
Finally, Robertson testified that he visited Dustin at the Scholl property the 
night before the accident to tell him he needed the tractor and baler back soon. See R. Vol. 
11, p. 259 (p. 65, lime 23 - p. 66, line 3). Roberlson testified that it was at least 10:00 or 
11:00 at night and pitch black and that Dustin was baling straw at that time. See R. Vol. II, 
p. 259 (p. 66, LL 4-24). Robertson further testified that thcre were no lights on the baler at 
that time. See R. Vol. 11, p. 259 (p. 66, line 15 -p. 67, line 5). 
Based on the evidence provided at the time of the summary judgment motions, 
there were issues of fact regarding whether Robertson knew or should have known that 
Dustin was likely to use the tractor and baler in a manner which would create an 
unreasonable risk of harm to others. Based on Robertson's knowledge of baling practices, 
when baling was most likely to occur, and the fact that the Scholl property consisted of 
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several non-contiguous parcels, a jury could have certainly concluded that Robertson should 
have known that Dustin would operate the tractor and baler at night and that the tractor and 
baler would be moved on a public road. Further, Robertson specifically knew that Kukla 
was baling the property at night because he had personally observed that activity the day 
prior to the accident. Because Robertson knew that the tractor and baler did not have 
working lights, but did not bother to inform Kukla of this and Robertson did not warn Kukla 
about operating the tractor and baler at night, nor did he ask Kukla if he planned on moving 
the tractor and baler at night, a jury could reasonably infer that Robertson acted negligently 
in allowing Kukla to borrow the tractor and baler. 
Based on his own testimony, Robertson had actual knowledge that Kukla was 
operating the tractor and baler on the Scholl property at night. Given this information, as 
well as his knowledge about the non-contiguous parcels, the fact that he knew the lights did 
not work, and that operating the tractor and baler on Highway 45 at night would create an 
unreasonable risk of danger to others, Robertson certainly should have at least inquired as to 
Kukla's practices regarding transporting tractor and balers at night and, therefore, most 
certainly should have reasonably known that there was a likelihood that Kukla would 
transport the tractor and baler from one field to another at night. As such, there were genuine 
issues of fact remaining for trial on Plaintiffs' claim for negligent entrustment and the district 
court properly denied Robertson's motion for summary judgment. 
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C The District Court Properly Granted Plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial. 
1. Standard o f  Review. 
-
Robertson asserts that the district court erred in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for 
a New Trial. Withii this section of his Appellant's Brief, Robertson includes a section on 
the standard of review. See Appellant's Brief, p. 26. However, Robertson simply cites to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). This is not the proper standard of review. The proper 
standard of review as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court is that "This Court reviews the 
decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial under an abuse of discretion standard." See 
Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Constr., Znc., 144 Idaho 171, 173, 158 P.3d 947, 949 (2007). 
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, "the Court inquires: (1) whether the 
lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable 
to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by exercise of reason." 
See Warren v. Sharp, 139 Idaho 599, 602, 83 P.3d 773, 776 (2003). Therefore, this is the 
proper standard of review to be applied to the district court's decision to grant Plaintiffs' 
motion for new trial. 
2. The District Court proDperIy exercised its discretion in grarztiy1.p 
Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. 
Having failed to provide the proper standard of review by this Court of the 
district court's decision to grant a new trial, Robertson then fails to discuss whether the 
district court abused its discretion in granting the new trial. Applying the factors identified 
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above to the district court's decision, it is clear that the court recognized that the issue was 
one within its discretion. The district court set forth the inconsistencies within the verdict 
and then expressly noted that it was taking into account all the evidence it had heard in 
determining that it could not conceive of how the jury came to the conclusion it did. See R 
Vol. 111, pp. 454-455. The district court then held, consistent with its exercise of discretion, 
that the verdict delivered by the jury with regard to the answers given on proximate cause 
relating to Robertson's conduct amount to an inconsistency with their apportionment of 
damages and, therefore, Plaintiffs were entitled to a new trial. See R. Vol. 111, p. 455. 
Nowhere within Robertson's brief does he argue that the district court abused 
its discretion in granting Plaintiffs' motion for new trial. Rather, Robertson appears to seek a 
de novo review by this Court, despite identifying no legal error committed by the district 
court. Robertson simply disagrees with the district court's decision. Absent a showing of an 
abuse of discretion by the district court, there is no basis for overturning the district court's 
decision to grant the new trial and, as such, Robertson's appeal should be denied and the 
Court should affirm the district court's decision. 
3. - Robertson has failed to include the special verdict form or the iurv 
instructions within the record on au~eal  and, therefore, there is no 
basis uuon which the Court can reverse the District Court's decision. 
On appeal, the Court "does not assume error," rather "the party assigning error 
must affirmatively show it." See Student Loan Fund v. Duerner, 13 1 Idaho 45, 54,95 1 P.2d 
1272, 1281 (1997). The appellant has the responsibility to include exhibits and transcripts of 
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hearings in the record before the appellate court. See id. When the record on appeal does not 
contain the evidence taken into account by the district court, the court "must necessarily 
presume that the evidence justifies the decision and that the findings are supported by 
substantial evidence." Jones v. Jones, 117 Idaho 621,625,790 P.2d 914,918 (1990). 
In this case, the record on appeal does not, to the best of Plaintiffs' ability to 
discern, contain the special verdict form. Although Robertson cites to the Special Verdict 
Form within his brief, the citation is to the form itself, not to the volume or pages of the 
record where the verdict form is located. See Appellant's Brief, p. 4-5. Further, the record 
on appeal does not contain the final jury instructions given by the district court. Within the 
district court's written decision granting the new trial, the district court expressly referenced 
an inconsistency between Instruction 20 and the jury's answers within the Special Verdict 
Form. See R. Vol. 111, p. 454. Finally, Robertson quotes two jury instructions within his 
Appellant's Brief. See Appellant's Brief, p. 29. Yet, those jury instructions are not included 
within the record on appeal and there is no citation to the record for those jury instructions. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6) requires that the Appellant's Brief include argument with 
citations to the parts of the record relied upon. Thus, Robertson has failed to provide this 
Court with an adequate record on appeal. Because the documents necessary to support 
Robertson's appeal have not been included within the record on appeal, the Court should 
deny Robertson's appeal and a f f m  the district court's grant of the motion for new trial. 
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4. - The iuw verdict was inconsistent and the Court vroperlv granted 
Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial. 
Although Plaintiffs believe that the appeal of this issue should be denied 
because the Special Verdict Form is not within the record and the Appellant failed to include 
the final jury instructions within the record, in the event the Court decides to address this 
issue despite the full record andlor in the event the Appellant cures this defect prior to oral 
argument, Plaintiffs respectfully assert that the district court's decision granting the new trial 
should be affirmed. 
There can be no dispute that the Special Verdict Form as completed by the 
jury in this matter is inconsistent. As was set forth within Appellant's Brief, the special 
verdict form was returned by the jury as follows: 
WE, THE JURY, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Ouestion 1: Was Defendant Darrell L. Robertson negligent in 
loaning the tractor and hay baler to Defendant Dustin M. Kukla? 
YES X No - 
... 
Ouestion 2: Was the negligence of Defendant Darrell L. 
Robertson a proximate cause of the death of the Decedent and 
any injuries the Plaintiffs? 
YES - No -X- 
... 
Question 3: Was the negligence of Defendant Dustin M. Kukla 
a proximate cause of the death of the Decedent and any injuries 
to the Plaintiffs? 
YES - -  X No- 
... 
Question 4: Did Defendant Darrell Robertson negligently 
entrust Defendant Dustin Kukla with a tractor and hay baler? 
YES - No 3- 
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... 
Ouestion 6: Did Defendant Dustin Kukla operate the tractor and 
baler on the highway and at the time of the occurrence with the 
exoress or imvlied vermission of Defendant Darrell Robertson? 
. . . 
Question 8: Was the Decedent, Kenneth Tiegs, negligent in the 
operation of his vehicle at the time and place of the occurrence 
in auestion? 
YES - X  No 
. . . 
Ouestion 9: Was the Decedent, Kenneth Tiegs' negligent [sic] 
in the operation of his vehicle at the time and place of the 
occurrence in auestion a oroximate cause of his death? 
Special Verdict Form, pp. 1-9. 
As to Defendant Darrell Robertson? 15 % 
As to Defendant Dustin Kukla? 80 % 
As to Decedent Kenneth Tiegs? 5% 
Id. at 10 (as is set forth in Appellant's Brief, p. 5). 
As can be seen from the special verdict form, at no point in time did the jury 
find that either Robertson's or Kenneth Tiegs' ("Tiegs") negligence was a proximate cause 
of Tiegs' death or the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs. Despite this fact, both Robertson and 
Tiegs were assigned a portion of fault. Moreover, despite failing to find that Robertson's 
actions were a proximate cause of Tiegs' death, the jury awarded Plaintiffs damages. As 
such, the jury verdict is not only inconsistent, but also against the law. Therefore, a new trial 
of this matter is should be granted under Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 49 and 59(a)(6). 
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a - The Special Verdict Form completed bv the iurv is inconsistent 
and therefore a new trial must be manted pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 49. 
Where a jury returns a verdict that is consistent both between answers 
provided to individual interrogatories and with the general verdict, judgment should be 
entered in accordance with the answers and verdict. I.R.C.P. 49(b). Ilowever, "[wlhen the 
answers [to special interrogatories] are inconsistent with each other and one or more is 
likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of judgment 
but may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a 
new trial." Id. In Beco Const. Co., Inc.v. Harper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 10, 936 
P.2d 202, 208 (Ct. App. 1997), the Court held that although Rule 49(a), which expressly 
deals with special verdicts, does not provide the procedure for dealing with an inconsistent 
verdict form, when faced with an inconsistent special verdict form, a trial court may utilize 
the procedures set forth in Rule 49(b). Id. 
In this case, the jury was presented with several theories under which 
Robertson could be liable for the death of Tiegs and for Plaintiffs' injuries. The first theory 
submitted was a simple negligence claim for the actions taken by Robertson, or by the failure 
of Robertson to act, when loaning the tractor and hay baler to Defendant Dustin Kukla 
("Kukla"). Questions 1 and 2 of the Special Verdict Form addressed this theory of liability. 
While the jury found that Robertson was negligent in loaning the tractor and baler, it 
declined to find that this negligence was a proximate cause of Tiegs' death or any injuries 
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suffered by Plaintiffs. See Special Verdict Form, pp. 1-2. Thus, the jury found that under 
this theory of negligence, Robertson shared no responsibility for the collision or damages 
arising therefkom. 
Plaintiffs' second theory of liability was that Robertson had negligently 
entrusted Kukla with the tractor and hay baler. When addressing this theory in Question 4, 
the jury found that Robertson had not negligently entrusted Kukla with the tractor and baler. 
Implicit in this finding is the determination that, under this cause of action, Robertson had no 
share of responsibility for the collision or damages arising theretkom. The third and final 
cause of action against Robertson was imputed liability. Again the jury determined that 
Robertson had no liability as it determined Kukla did not have the express or implied 
permission of Robertson to operate the tractor and baler on the highway at the time of the 
occurrence. As with the theories of negligence and negligent entrustment, this determination 
of the jury mandates a finding that Robertson shared no responsibility for the collision and 
therefore has no obligation to pay damages. 
Despite the determination that Robertson had done notKing to proximately 
cause Tiegs' death and the resulting damages to Plaintiffs, the jury found that Robertson bore 
fifteen percent (15%) of the fault. This determination simply cannot be reconciled with the 
finding that Robertson's negligence was not the proximate cause of Tiegs' death and 
Plaintiffs' damages. Nor can this determination be reconciled with the finding that 
Robertson did not negligently entrust the tractor and baler to Kukla. Finally, this 
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determination cannot be reconciled with the finding that Kukla was operating the tractor and 
baler without the express or implied permission of Robertson. 
The inconsistencies did not stop with the determination of fault in Question 
No. 10. Despite being expressly instructed that "the jury must determine the amount of 
money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the Plaintiffs for anv damapes 
proximatelv caused bv Defendant Darrell Robertson's neplipence" the jury awarded 
damages to Plaintiffs. See Final Instruction No. 20 (emphasis added). Again, under no cause 
of action did the jury find that Robertson's actions were the proximate cause of Plaintiffs' 
damages. Despite this determination, the jury awarded damages to the Plaintiffs. As with 
the percentage of fault, under no viewing of the Special Verdict Form can the damage award 
be reconciled with the precedmg questions. The fact that the jury determined Robertson to 
be 15% at fault and owed damages of $2,500.00 to each Plaintiff indicates that the jury 
believed Robertson to be responsible, at least in part, for Tiegs' death. However, the jury's 
answers to Questions 2, 4 and 6 indicate the jury believed Robertson had no responsibility 
for Tiegs' death. 
Finally, the jury verdict was also inconsistent as to its findings regarding 
Tiegs. The jury determined that Tiegs was negligent in the operation of his vehicle, but that 
this negligence was not a proximate cause of his death. See Special Verdict Form, pp. 8-9. 
Despite the failure to find proximate cause, Tiegs was determined to be five percent (5%) at 
fault for the collision. Id. at pp. 10-1 1. These determinations cannot be reconciled. 
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Robertson first asserts that when faced with an arguably inconsistent verdict, 
the trial court must look at the evidence presented and the instructions given and see if there 
is a view of the case that makes the jury's answer consistent. See Appellant's Brief, p. 27. 
This is exactly what the district court did in this case. As was set forth above, the district 
court expressly stated that " W i g  all of the evidence heard by this court, the same evidence 
heard by the jury, this court cannot conceive of how the jury came to the conclusion it did 
with regard to the apportioned fault on Defendant Robertson's behalf when they claim none 
of his actions proximately caused Kenneth Tiegs' death." Thus, the district court clearly 
looked at all the evidence and was unable to find a view of the case that made the jury's 
answer consistent. Robertson asserts that the jury did not intend to find that the actions of 
Robertson were a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' damages, but offers no explanation for the 
inconsistencies in the jury's verdict or how the jury could award damages in light of an 
instruction which expressly told them they could only award damages they found were 
proximately caused by Robertson. This Court has held that each jury instruction is to be 
given the same consideration as the rest and the instructions must be considered as a whole. 
See Davis v. Bushnell, 93 Idaho 528,532,465 P.2d 652,656 (1970). 
The onIy certainty that arises fiom the SpeciaI Verdict Form is that the jury, 
despite its best efforts, did not understand the interplay between proximate cause and 
damages, made a mistake and rendered an inconsistent verdict. Because this matter was 
within the sound discretion of the district court, and the district court properly exercised that 
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discretion, the district court's decision granting Plaintiffs'motion for new trial pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 49(b) should be affirmed. 
D. The Special Verdict Form Completed by the Jury is Against the Law 
and Therefore a New Trial Must be Granted pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6). 
In this case, the district court did not expressly grant the motion for new trial 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Procedure 59(a)(6). Rather, the district court relied upon Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 49(b). See R. Vol. 111, p. 455. Nonetheless, Robertson has asserted 
that a new trial was not appropriate under Rule 59(a)(6). For the reasons set forth below, 
Plaintiffs respectklly assert that the grant of a new trial was appropriate under Rule 59 
(a)(6). 
Rule 59(a)(6) provides that a new trial may be granted where there is 
"insufficien[t] evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law." 
(Emphasis added). As with a Rule 49 motion, the decision to grant or deny a motion for new 
h id  under Rule 59(a) is a matter within the discretion of a trial court. Quick v. Crane, 11 1 
Idaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986). On a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) , 
a trial judge may set aside the verdict "even though there is substantial evidence to support 
it." Id. at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195 citing Wright & Miller, 11 Federal Practice and Procedure 5 
2806, at 43 (1973 & Supp.1985). Moreover, there is no requirement that a trial judge view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict-winner. Id. As noted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Blaine v. Byers: "the trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied 
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the verdict is not supported by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is 
not in accord with the clear weight of the evidence and that the ends of justice would be 
subserved by vacating it, or when the verdict is not in accord with either law or justice." 91 
Idaho 665, 671, 429 P.2d 397, 403 (1967) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, where a trial court is "'left with the defmite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed, it is to be expected that he will grant a new trial."' Quick, 11 1 Idaho at 
768, 727 P.2d at 1196 quoting Wright & Miller, 11 Federal Practice and Procedure $2806, at 
49 (1973 & Supp.1985) (emphasis added). 
It is beyond question that where a party seeks damages based upon negligence, 
in order to recover the jury must determine that the negligence was a proximate cause of the 
resulting damage. Notwithstanding its determination that Robertson neither negligently 
entrusted the tractor and baler to Kukla nor committed negligence that was a proximate cause 
of Tiegs' death and Plaintiffs' injuries, the jury found Robertson 15% at fault and liable for 
damages. These determinations clearly violate the principles of negligence recognized by 
the Idaho courts, statutes and rules. 
Likewise, Idaho Code 5 49-2417 imputes liability to the owner of a vehicle 
only where the driver is operating with the owner's permission. Although finding that Kukla 
was beyond the permission granted by Robertson, Robertson was deemed to be liable. As 
with the theories of negligence, the outcome reached by the jury violates Idaho Code $ 49- 
2417. Moreover, the jury assigned a percentage of fault to Tiegs while simultaneously 
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finding that no action of Tiegs was a proximate cause of his death. As is the case with the 
determinations regarding Robertson, such a finding is against the law. 
Robertson argues that a new trial should not be granted under Rule 59(a)(6) 
because a new trial would not present a substantively different result. Plaintiffs respectfully 
assert that a new trial would present a substantively different result because it would result in 
a consistent verdict which clearly determines whether or not Darrell Robertson bears any 
liability for the death of Kenneth Tiegs. That is substantively different from the inconsistent 
and irreconcilable verdict rendered by the jury in this matter. 
Robertson hrther argues that the verdict is not against the law because the 
finding of "fault" by the jury is not synonymous with negligence. Robertson asserts that 
there is no reason to believe that by answering Question 10 of the Special Verdict Form 
(asking them to apportion fault) the jurors were making any determination as to negligence 
and supports this argument by citing to jury instructions (not provided in the record on 
appeal) which define negligence and proximate cause but which do not use the world "fault." 
This argument belies the plain meaning of the word fault. It also begs the question of what it 
was that Robertson believes the jury was apportioning. Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"fault" as "[a]n error or defect of judgment or of conduct; any deviation from prudence or 
duty resulting from inattention, incapacity, perversity, bad faith, or mismanagement. See 
NEGLIGENCE. Cf LIABILITY." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (7" Ed. 1999). A lay 
dictionary defines fault as "responsibility for failure or a wrong.11 act[.]" Dictionury.com 
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Unabridged (v 1.1) Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary, Random House, 
Inc. 2006, available at htp://dictionary.reference.com/browse/fault. 
Thus, the jury's verdict clearly determined that Robertson was 15% 
responsible for Plaintiffs' damages. Such a fmdmg is entirely inconsistent with the law of 
negligence because the law clearly holds that there can be no liability or responsibility when 
there is no proximate cause. See e.g., Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 699, 8 P.3d 1234, 
1242 (2000) (setting forth the elements of negligence). As such, the district court properly 
exercised its discretion in granting Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. Although it did not 
reference Rule 59(a)(6) in the decision granting the motion, the district court did state that 
Robertson had "failed to address how the verdict could be anything but inconsistent, hence, 
against the law, in view of Instruction 20." See R. Vol. 111, p. 454. Thus, the district court 
did determine that the verdict was against the law, as required for a new trial under Rule 
59(a)(6). Additionally, as was set forth above, the district court clearly considered all of the 
evidence in rendering his decision. As such, the district court properly exercised his 
discretion in granting the new trial and his order should be affirmed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and supported by the record on appeal in this 
matter, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court decline to review the district court's 
denial of Robertson's motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, a f f i  the denial of 
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that motion. Plaintiffs further request that the Court affirm the district court's decision to 
grant Plaintiffs motion for new trial pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 49(b). 
DATED this &day of January, 2010. 
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